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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jeffery Lewis Dunn appeals from the district court’s Judgment of Conviction. The jury
convicted Mr. Dunn of three counts of lewd conduct. Mr. Dunn’s convictions were previously
vacated and his case remanded for a new trial.

He asserts that his second trial was also

contaminated by errors and that his convictions must again be vacated.
Specifically, Mr. Dunn asserts that the district court erred and abused its discretion when
it allowed the State to present a portion of his testimony from the prior trial. The testimony was
not presented in its entirety due to the district court ruling that I.R.E. 404(b) evidence presented
in the last trial was inadmissible in the second trial. One of the three portions of testimony
presented to the jury was taken out of context and the meaning of the testimony was greatly
altered. Mr. Dunn asserts that this portion of prior testimony should not have been presented as
it was, when taken out of context, unfairly prejudicial. Although the testimony was relevant, it
was minimally probative and the probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.
During the trial, Mr. Dunn made two motions for mistrial; the first after S.E. alluded to
Mr. Dunn being a registered sex offender when she was staying with him and the second after
Brianne Bierma informed the jury that Mr. Dunn had been in prison. Mr. Dunn asserts that the
district court erred in denying his motions for mistrial.
Additionally, Mr. Dunn asserts that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct which
deprived him of a fair trial. The prosecution violated its duty to see that Mr. Dunn had a fair trial
by appealing to the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the jury. Mr. Dunn contends that the
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misconduct committed in his case constituted fundamental error and that the error is not
harmless.
Finally, Mr. Dunn asserts that the errors are not harmless or, alternatively, that the errors
amount to cumulative error, depriving him of his right to a fair trial.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s erroneous assertion that Mr. Dunn’s
testimony conveyed the same meaning at the second trial as it did in the first, the State’s reliance
on an improper harmless error standard, and that Mr. Dunn invited Ms. Bierma’s prejudicial
statement by questioning her on an unrelated matter.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Dunn’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES1
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed the State to read a portion of
Mr. Dunn’s prior testimony that was taken out of context and, as a result, was overly
prejudicial?

II.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Dunn’s motions for a mistrial?

III.

Did the State violate Mr. Dunn’s right to a fair trial by committing prosecutorial
misconduct?

IV.

Even if the above errors are individually harmless, was Mr. Dunn’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process of law violated because the accumulation of errors
deprived him of his right to a fair trial?

1

Mr. Dunn will not be providing a response to the issues regarding prosecutorial misconduct or
cumulative error because the State’s arguments on these issues are unremarkable and, as such, do
not warrant additional briefing.
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed The State To Read A Portion Of
Mr. Dunn’s Prior Testimony That Was Taken Out Of Context And, As A Result, Was Overly
Prejudicial
In the Respondent’s Brief, the State asserted numerous times that Mr. Dunn’s testimony
at the second trial was presented in a way that conveyed the same meaning as it did in the first
trial: “Dunn desired M.T.”

(Respondent’s Brief, pp.12, 14, 15.)

The State’s assertion is

specious.
In the first trial, Mr. Dunn answered a long line of questioning about his prior sexual
offender treatment. (Tr. Trial 1, p.470, L.3 – p.476, L.2.) During this line of questioning, he
admitted that he had been taught to avoid contact with female minors within the age range of his
prior victim. (Tr. Trial 1, p.471, Ls.3-8.) The questioning continued:
Q.

Why are those directives in place? When you’re on probation receiving
treatment, why are those given to you as thing you are to do?

A.

I don’t know that I can answer that. That’s just the way – that’s the rules
they have. So.

Q.

Is there some level of understanding to remove you from a desire to do
that? That would have come out in your treatment. Correct?

A.

I think that’s accurate.

Q.

And so there’s conditions put in place [for] the sole purpose of removing
you from the temptation of what you desire. Correct? Not suggesting you
desired these three victims. That’s not what I am driving at. You have a
desire that you’ve acted on in 1995.

A.

Right, okay.

Q.

Correct?

A.

Yes.
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Q.

In order to remove you from the ability to act on that desire that’s been
identified, you are told to stay away?

A.

Yes, sir.

(Tr. Trial 1, p.473, L.24 – p.474, L.19.) It is clear that the prosecutor was discussing a past
deviant desire toward girls of a certain age and precautions that were to be taken to ensure that
any past desire was not provoked and/or acted upon again. In fact, he went so far as to
specifically note that he was not suggesting that Mr. Dunn desired the alleged victims. (Tr. Trial
1, p.474, Ls.8-11.) The State’s current and contrary assertion, that this line of questioning was
for the explicit purpose of showing that Mr. Dunn desired M.T., is disingenuous.
Instead, this line of questing was designed to show that Mr. Dunn had disregarded his
treatment and the safety precautions built-in for the purpose of attempting to avoid contact that
could trigger a desire that had been present in the past. The testimony in no way implied that
because Mr. Dunn had desired a young female in the past he automatically desired all young
females or M.T. specifically. 2 Further, contrary to the State’s assertions, the line of questioning
did not attempt to show that Mr. Dunn’s past desires toward girls of a specific age range were
actually triggered prior to M.T. spending the night at his home. Notably, Mr. Dunn never
admitted to desiring M.T. during this testimony.
However, the limited excerpt read to the jury during the second trial conveyed the
opposite:
Q.

And as I asked you before, you had initially rebuffed, I assume [A.D.] was
probably bugging the heck out of you to let [M.T.] spend the night?

A.

Yes, sir.

2

A past desire cannot, in and of itself, be decidedly indicative of future or current desire. For
example, it is absurd to believe that because a woman had once previously desired a man in his
20’s, she must now desire all men in their 20’s.
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Q.

She was pulling all over you to have a friend spend the night. I have no
doubt that’s how it plays out. Right?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And you rebuffed that?

A.

In the beginning, yes.

Q.

And in part, rebuffed that based upon you knowing you must –

A.

Yes.

Q.

-- separate yourself from the object of desire.

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

But you didn’t stick with that one either. Right?

A.

No, sir.

(Tr., p.393, L.6-24.) The testimony, as presented in the second trial, incorrectly conveys that
Mr. Dunn had previously testified that he desired M.T.

As such, contrary to the State’s

assertions otherwise, this excerpt of testimony was taken out of context, obscured the meaning of
the actual testimony and, as a result, mislead the jury. This erroneously admitted testimony was
undoubtedly devastating to Mr. Dunn’s case.
The State next asserts that, “[e]ven if the district court abused its discretion in admitting
the excerpt of Dunn’s testimony regarding M.T. spending the night, the error was harmless.”
(Respondent’s Brief, p.17.)

The State has asserted the error was harmless for two reasons.

First, the State erroneously asserts that “similar” evidence was admitted through another witness.
(Respondent’s Brief, pp.17-18.) Second, using an incorrect standard, the State asserts that the
error was harmless because the State presented “overwhelming evidence of guilt.”
(Respondent’s Brief, pp.18-21.) These arguments are erroneous.
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While Detective McKenna testified about Mr. Dunn initially denying requests for M.T. to
spend the night and his concern that it “would” or “potentially” put him in a bad spot, he did not
testify that Mr. Dunn had told him that M.T. was an object of his desire. (Tr., p.380, L.17 –
p.387, L.14.) This testimony only reiterates that Mr. Dunn had been trained to avoid situations
that may trigger a desire in the future. It does not prove a current desire. Similarly, Mr. Dunn’s
statement that he would be “pissed” if his daughter slept in a bed with a friend’s father does not
imply that he desired M.T. (Tr., p.382, Ls.9-22.) Detective McKenna’s testimony was not
“similar” on the critical issue – whether Mr. Dunn expressed a desire of M.T. As such, the
admission of excerpt of testimony from the first trial cannot be harmless for the first reason
articulated by the State.
The State also asserted that the error was harmless because the State presented
“overwhelming evidence of guilt.” (Respondent’s Brief, pp.18-21.) The suggestion is that this
Court should consider whether the jury would have found Mr. Dunn guilty had they not heard the
misleading excerpt of Mr. Dunn’s testimony from the first trial. While the State initially quotes
the harmless error standard accurately, the legal premise quoted is simply wrong.
This Court has recognized:
Under the Chapman harmless error analysis, where a constitutional violation
occurs at trial, and is followed by a contemporaneous objection, a reversal is
necessitated, unless the State proves “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”
(State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598 (2013) (citing State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2010)
(in turn quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).) Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court has held:
The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the
error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty
verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error. That
must be so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact
7

rendered—no matter how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might
be—would violate the jury-trial guarantee.
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279-80 (1993) (citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578
(1986); Clark, 478 U.S at 593 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497,
509–510 (1987) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).) Notably, in reversing the defendant’s conviction,
the Almaraz Court noted, “the State never specifically argues that [improperly admitted
testimony] did not ‘contribute to the verdict obtained’ as clearly required under Perry.”
Almaraz, 154 Idaho at 598.

Thus, it is not enough for the State to assert that there was

“overwhelming evidence.” The State must first assert, and then prove beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the testimony did not contribute to the guilty verdict actually attained.

II.
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Dunn’s Motions For A Mistrial3
The State asserted that Mr. Dunn “elicited Bierma’s comment” and, as such, any error is
not reversible. (Respondent’s Brief, pp.25-26.) While it is clear that Ms. Bierma made the
inappropriate comment during Mr. Dunn’s questioning, the question asked did not have anything
to do with Mr. Dunn potentially being in custody. Instead, it was a statement that was entirely
unsolicited by defense counsel.
During cross-examination, Ms. Bierma was asked, “[a]nd Jeff’s attitude toward her
getting birth control was that he was not happy with her being – acting out sexually, correct?”
(Tr., p.330, Ls.23-25.) Ms. Bierma responded, “[h]e had nothing to do with any of that. He was

3

On appeal, Mr. Dunn has asserted two separate grounds for declaring a mistrial. (Appellant’s
Brief, pp.15-20.) In this Reply Brief, he only addresses the second ground, Ms. Bierma’s
statement regarding Mr. Dunn being in prison. The State’s arguments on the first ground is
unremarkable and, as such, does not warrant additional briefing.
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in prison already.” (Tr., p.331, Ls.1-2.) Certainly, the question did not require an answer that
would mention Mr. Dunn being in custody. Unlike the witness in Atkinson, Ms. Bierma did not
supply “an accurate, fair and responsive answer to defense counsel’s question.”

State v.

Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 821 (Ct. App. 1993). In fact, the district court struck the testimony
because it was “not responsive.” (Tr., p.331, Ls.5-7.) As such, the statement regarding prison
was not solicited by defense counsel and cannot constitute invited error.
Next, the State appears to argue that Mr. Dunn raised, as a specific error on appeal, that
the district court incorrectly instructed the jury following the motion for mistrial. (Respondent’s
Brief, pp.28-29.) Mr. Dunn made no such argument. Instead, he argued that the motion for
mistrial was erroneously denied and, in arguing that the error in denying the motion for mistrial
amounted to reversible error, argued that later attempts to mitigate the harm may have increased
the continuing impact the evidence had on the trial. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.19-20.)
The State also asserts that Mr. Dunn requested that the district court provide that
instruction. (Respondent’s Brief, p.29.) This is a mischaracterization of the events surrounding
the motion for mistrial. Trial counsel’s request for a mistrial was clear. Counsel noted that, “I
think it places the Defense in kind of a bad position that any potential of curing this, any further
mention of it, is kind of like scratching at an old wound or scab. It’s just going to make it
worse.” (Tr., p.333, Ls.17-20.) Counsel noted that “we would stand on our motion for mistrial.”
(Tr., p.333, L.21.) Counsel’s later efforts to mitigate the prejudice by asking that the court take
judicial notice that Mr. Dunn was not in prison was not a blanket acquiesces to the jury
instruction and was only suggested in the event the motion was denied. To the extent counsel
agreed to an alternative remedy, if the motion was to be denied, it was just to “ask the Court to
take judicial notice that [Mr. Dunn] was not in prison.” (Tr., p.333, Ls.22-25.) It was the
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prosecutor that requested the judicial notice be limited “to the time frame.” (Tr., p.335, L.2 –
p.336, L.5.) It was this limitation that invited the jury to speculate about whether Mr. Dunn was
in prison at another time. Following the discussion, once it was a forgone conclusion that the
motion was denied and a limiting instruction would be given, counsel then requested that the
instruction be giving immediately, not later. (Tr., p.338, Ls.1-6.)
Mr. Dunn maintains that this Court can consider the instruction provided in determining
“the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that triggered the mistrial motion.” State v.
Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007). He asserts that there is a great danger that the jury considered
information that Mr. Dunn had been incarcerated to his detriment, that it had a continuing impact
on the trial, may have contributed to the verdict, and, ultimately, deprived Mr. Dunn of his right
to a fair trial.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Dunn respectfully requests that his convictions be vacated and his case remanded for
a new trial.
DATED this 22nd day of May, 2018.

___________/s/______________
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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